Accomodation of Reputational Interests and Free Press: A Call for a Strict Interpretation of Gertz by Wall, Tom
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 11 | Number 2 Article 8
1983
Accomodation of Reputational Interests and Free
Press: A Call for a Strict Interpretation of Gertz
Tom Wall
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation




INTERESTS AND FREE PRESS: A CALL FOR A
STRICT INTERPRETATION OF GERTZ
I. Introduction
Defamation law' clearly limits the freedom of the press.' Neverthe-
less, courts traditionally refused to extend first amendment 3 protec-
1. To successfully bring a defamation action, a plaintiff must establish four ele-
ments: (1) defamatory language (2) about the plaintiff (3) which is published and (4)
which causes injury to the plaintiff's reputation. Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627
S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (an assertion that either a hotel manager or
employees were engaged in a robbery constituted slander); see Hearst Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 167 F.2d 225, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (plaintiff defamed by a misleading descrip-
tion of the way he operated a radio station); Albert Miller & Co. v. Corte, 107 F.2d
432, 435 (5th Cir. 1939) (plaintiff libeled by an article accusing him of contributing
to the deplorable condition of the early Irish potato market), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
688 (1940).
"Defamation, made up of the twin torts of libel and slander, is an invasion of the
right of personal security in a reputation and good name." General Motors Corp. v.
Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95, 113, 340 A.2d 767, 780 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (citing W.
PROSSEn, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971)) (finding a slanderous
imputation from the conduct of an employer's security staff in detaining an employee
as he was leaving the employer's plant), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 277 Md. 165, 352
A.2d 810 (1976), appeal after remand, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977).
Libel is printed or written defamation of a person. Williams v. Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai Brith, 185 F.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (stating the general
principle but, on the facts, finding that the plaintiff was not libeled); Caldwell v.
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 161 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1947) (plaintiff libeled
by an article alleging he stated that a mob which lynched a suspected rapist had
saved the court trouble); Kelley v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 697-701, 61 A.2d 143,
145-46 (1948) (discussing without deciding whether a radio broadcast is libel or
slander); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(1) (1977) ("Libel consists of
the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodi-
ment in physical form or by any other form of communication that has the poten-
tially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.").
Slander consists of oral or spoken defamation. Simpson v. Oil Transfer Corp., 75
F. Supp. 819, 822 (N.D.N.Y. 1948) (telephone conversation relating to plaintiff's
professional conduct may constitute slander); Chambers v. National Battery Co., 34
F. Supp. 834, 836 (W.D. Mo. 1940) (statements to a stenographer were slanderous);
Butler v. Freyman, 216 Mo. App. 636, 640, 260 S.W. 523, 525 (Ct. App. 1924)
(statement by store clerk that plaintiff helped another person steal a hat was slander-
ous); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(2) (1977) ("Slander consists of
the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures or by any
form of communication other than those" which constitute libel.).
Defamatory language includes "words which tend to expose one to public hatred,
shame, obloquy. . . degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in
the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and
friendly intercourse in society." Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262
N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933) (newspaper article which stated that a
woman who ran a rooming house was courted by a murderer was not libelous); see
Christopher v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1948) (a charge that
one is a Nazi or is pro-Nazi is defamatory); Laun v. Union Elec. Co. of Missouri, 350
402 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
Mo. 572, 577, 166 S.W.2d 1065, 1067-68 (1942) (allegation that plaintiff stole money
by padding bills for services and for insurance constituted defamation); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 565-566 (1977) (defamatory communication
may consist of (a) a statement of fact or (b) an opinion which implies undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion).
The defamatory character of the words is measured by their everyday meaning
under the circumstances. Flowers v. Zayre Corp., 286 F. Supp. 119, 121 (D.S.C.
1968) (statement that plaintiff was trying to bribe a security guard is slanderous);
McRae v. Afro-America Co., 172 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (statement
implying that plaintiff was at least partly responsible for her daughter's suicide was
reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning), af'd, 274 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1960);
Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 148, 325 So. 2d 137, 142 (1975) (whether
statement that a candidate for district attorney faced fraud charges was defamatory
presented a jury question); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 (1977)
("The meaning of a communication is that which the recipient correctly, or mistak-
enly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to express.").
The defamatory language must refer to the plaintiff. Durski v. Chaneles, 175 N.J.
Super. 418, 419-20, 419 A.2d 1134, 1135 (App. Div. 1980) (where article made no
express or implied reference to the wives of the plaintiffs, the wives could not recover
for defamation); Dijkstra v. Westerlink, 168 N.J. Super. 128, 133, 401 A.2d 1118,
1120 (App. Div. 1979) (jury question presented where defendant made a statement to
police accusing, without naming, the plaintiff of shooting at him); Arnold v. Sharpe,
296 N.C. 533, 539, 251 S.E.2d 452, 456 (1979) (court must consider the alleged
defamation in the context of the entire communication); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1977) (defamatory communication refers to the person to
whom its recipient reasonably understands that it was intended to refer).
The defendant must publish or communicate the defamatory statement to a person
other than the plaintiff. Carson v. Southern Ry. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1104, 1113
(D.S.C. 1979) (failure to prove publication of the allegedly slanderous statement is
fatal to plaintiff's cause of action); Willis v. Demopolis Nursing Home, Inc., 336 So.
2d 1117, 1120 (Ala. 1976) (stating the general rule that where there is no publication,
there is no defamation); McGuire v. Adkins, 284 Ala. 602, 603, 226 So. 2d 659, 661
(1969) (failure of complaint to state when, where, and to whom slander was pub-
lished was a fatal omission); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1977)
(publication may be intentional or negligent).
Intent to defame is not a necessary element in an action for defamation. Gariepy v.
Pearson, 207 F.2d 15, 16 (D.C. Cir.) (irrelevant that defendant did not intend to
defame the plaintiff), cert. denied, 346 U.S, 909 (1953); Kilian v. Stackpole Sons,
Inc., 98 F. Supp. 500, 503 (M.D. Pa. 1951) ("Everyone who requests, procures, or
commands another to publish a libel is prima facie answerable"); Weller v. Home
News Publishing Co., 112 N.J. Super. 502, 508, 271 A.2d 738 (Law Div. 1970)
(plaintiff falsely identified as charity patient need show only intent to publish, not
intent to defame). At common law, the plaintiff was required to show only that the
defendant intentionally published the article; no liability was imposed for a publi-
cation which the defendant did not intend to publish or could not reasonably antici-
pate that anyone but the defamed would overhear. Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406, 410 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (liability imposed where
plaintiff's picture was improperly identified by the media as being that of a suspect in
a bank robbery); Willis v. Demopolis Nursing Home, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1117, 1118-20
(Ala. 1976) (recognizing general rule that there is no defamation without a publi-
cation, but reserving the question whether a letter from the employer's attorney to
the employee's attorney constituted publication).
Unless the publication is libelous or slanderous per se, the plaintiff must prove
special, or particular, damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977)
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(libel per se does not require showing of special harm). "Per se" means words which
on their face and without the aid of extrinsic proof are recognized as injurious.
Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d 588, 591-92 (4th Cir. 1976) (implication of an
extra-marital affair was intrinsically defamatory and no proof of injury is required);
Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 433, 437-39, 146 A.2d 880, 883-84 (1959) (statements
which impute to a police officer qualities rendering him unfit to serve are actionable
without proof of damage); Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 538, 251 S.E.2d 452, 456
(1979) (whether alleged defamation constitutes libel per se depends on its context
within the entire communication); Redding v. Carlton, 223 Pa. Super. 136, 138 n. 1,
296 A.2d 880, 881 n.1 (Super. Ct. 1972) (statement concerning township supervisor's
potential self-dealing is not libelous per se). A publication which implied that the
plaintiff committed a crime or which has the tendency to injure him in his office,
profession, or calling is actionable per se. Brown v. Newman, 224 Tenn. 297, 300,
454 S.W.2d 120, 121-22 (1970) (statement which court interpreted to mean that
political influence had been exerted was not libelous per se but court noted that if the
statement said that "the palms are greased at the city council," it would be libelous
per se).
Words which charge a woman with unchastity are also actionable without proof of
particular damage. Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d 588, 591 (4th Cir. 1976);
Renew v. Serby, 237 S.C. 116, 119, 115 S.E.2d 664, 666-67 (1960) (statement
implying that female employee should not have sexual relations with her husband
because she had to work the next day carried no suggestion of unchastity). Similarly,
the implication that the plaintiff committed an indictable offense or an offense
involving moral turpitude is libelous per se. Cf. Brown v. WRMA Broadcasting Co.,
286 Ala. 186, 188, 238 So. 2d 540, 541 (1970) (implication that one has been fired is
not actionable per se). A false charge of some moral defect is also libelous per se.
Smith v. Phoenix Furniture Co., 339 F. Supp. 969, 971 (D.S.C. 1972) (calling the
plaintiff a "bastard" and a "son of a bitch" is not slander per se); cf. Ceravolo v.
Brown, 364 So. 2d 1155, 1156-57 (Ala. 1978) (berating someone in public with
threats and ethnic slurs is not slander per se).
2. Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320, 331, 153 A.2d 36, 42 (1959) (defa-
mation law conflicts with the counter-policy recognizing that in certain situations,
there is a privilege from liability for defamation); Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley
Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 557-58, 117 A.2d 889, 891 (1955) (policy embodied in
defamation occasionally conflicts with the counter-policy favoring free expression
and free press). The restriction may take the form of either prior restraint by
injunction or subsequent punishment in the form of money damages. In Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Supreme Court, reversing a conviction under a
Minnesota statute which permanently enjoined a newspaper from publishing because
it had published a defamatory article, held that prior restraints on the press were
unconstitutional. Id. at 715. The Court suggested that subsequent punishment is the
appropriate remedy and is consistent with the constitutional privilege of the press.
Id. It was recognized that "public officers, whose character and conduct remain
open to debate and free discussion in the press, find their remedies for false accusa-
tions in actions under libel laws providing for redress and punishment .. " Id. at
718-19. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (suppression of free speech justified by reasonable ground to believe that serious
evil or danger will result if free speech is practiced); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case is whether the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent"); cf.
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132-34 (1966) (state legislature could not constitution-
ally refuse to seat a duly elected legislator who said he supported individuals who
burned their draft cards but did not incite people to violate the draft registration
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tion to defamatory statements.4 Holding a defendant answerable for
defamatory publications was considered necessary to protect the indi-
vidual's reputation .5
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Supreme Court recognized
and addressed the need for an accommodation of the competing
interests of preserving reputation and fostering free expression 7 by the
press. This accommodation takes the form of a "federal rule" which
limits a state's power to award damages in defamation actions.8
New York Times provides that states may award damages in defa-
mation actions brought by public officials9 against media critics of
law); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503-11 (1951) (the government satisfied
its burden by showing a substantial interest in limiting the speech of petitioners who
created a "clear and present danger" by conspiring to organize the Communist party
and violently overthrow the government). See generally Sweeney v. Patterson, 128
F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.) ("[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the
field of free debate"), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscenity, like libel, is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality of a state criminal statute
prohibiting libel of blacks as a class); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) (upholding the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who called a city
marshal a "damned Fascist"). In Chaplinsky, the Court noted that prohibiting
certain well-defined, narrowly limited classes of speech has never been thought to
raise any constitutional problems. "These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 571-72.
5. Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320, 331, 153 A.2d 36, 42 (1959);
Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 557-58, 117 A.2d 889,
891 (1955). "An action for defamation is based on a violation of the fundamental
right of an individual to enjoy a reputation unimpaired by false and defamatory
attacks. The gist of such an action is injury to the plaintiff's reputation." Berg v.
Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 280 Pa. Super. 495, 500, 421 A.2d 831, 833 (Super.
Ct. 1980).
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. Id. at 267-69. The interests protected by the free press clause include: preserv-
ing free discussions of the problems of society, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
346-47 (1946); ensuring the "widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources," Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945); and protecting the vitality of our institutions by encouraging criticism,
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). To achieve these ends, the Court has
noted, the first amendment "must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that
explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow." Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
8. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
9. "Public officials" include "at the very least . . . those among the hierarchy of
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial respon-
sibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). Whether plaintiff is a public official is a question for the trial
judge to determine. Id. at 88.
1982] REPUTATIONAL INTERESTS
their official conduct only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant
acted with "actual malice."10 Subsequently, the Court extended the
New York Times" rule to public figures 2 and promulgated general
standards for identifying public figures.13 The Court declared uncon-
stitutional the common law standard of strict liability 4 in actions
10. "Actual malice" differs from common law malice which involves ill will or evil
intent. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974) (holding
that reporter portrayed the plaintiff in a false light with actual malice); cf. Greenbelt
Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970) (where the plaintiff was a
public figure, jury findings of falsehood and general hostility are insufficient to
support liability). The plaintiff must show that the defendant knowingly or recklessly
disregarded the truth of the statement which he published. "Reckless disregard" is
determined ad hoc on the basis of the publisher's subjective awareness of the state-
ment's probable falsity. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968) (hold-
ing that where the defendant failed to verify his information and did not consider the
possible defamatory effect of the statement on the plaintiff but there was no finding
of bad faith, the record was insufficient to support a finding of actual malice).
"There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731. TI'is
subjective awareness standard assumes "an opportunity on the part of the publisher
to evaluate the matter to be published and form some conclusion as to falsity or
doubts as to truth." Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 564 (Wyo.
1976) (former candidate for public office was a public figure); see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (public figures and public officials "may
recover for injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defama-
tory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for
the truth"); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 40-41 (D.C. 1979) (even if syndica-
tor knew nothing of journalist's reliability, this alone is insufficient to show actual
malice). See 3 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 36.05, at 20 (noting that "actual
malice has become a term of art to provide a convenient shorthand for the New York
Times standard of liability. . . .Whereas the common law standard focuses on the
defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff, actual malice concentrates on the defend-
ant's attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material published") (citing Cantrell
v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974)). Commentators have
suggested that the term "actual malice" as it is used in the New York Times rule
actually refers to "scienter." Id.; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 782 (1978); W. PROssER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 118, at 821 (4th
ed. 1971).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
12. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). "'Public figures' are those persons who,
though not public officials, are 'involved in issues in which the public has a justified
and important interest"' and such figures "include artists, athletes, business people,
dilettantes, [and] anyone who is famous or infamous because of who he is or what he
has done." Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine and Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 419
(9th Cir.)(famous baseball player was a public figure), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840
(1968); see also A.S. Abell v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 68, 265 A.2d 207, 214 (1970)
(public figure status depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case).
13. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43. See notes 48-54 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the standards of general application.
14. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43. As a general rule, strict liability provided that the
defendant was responsible for the consequences of a statement which he intentionally
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brought by private individuals. 15 Establishing negligence as a consti-
tutional minimum, 6 the Court delegated to the states the responsibil-
ity for formulating the proper standard of fault in actions brought by
private individuals. 7
This Note examines state court decisions applying the public figure
guidelines and establishing standards of fault for private actions. Fur-
ther, this Note discusses decisions extending the New York Times rule
to non-media defendants and restricting the plaintiff's opportunity to
prove a cause of action by favoring the use of summary judgment.
This Note argues that current defamation law accords excessive defer-
ence to the press, accepts too quickly the purported "chilling effect" of
libel judgments on the press, and ascribes insufficient significance to
individual and state interests in compensation for injury inflicted by
libelous press. Finally, this Note suggests an approach by which courts
might properly balance the respective interests involved.
II. Development of Constitutional Limitations
Historically, the right of a private individual to recover for injuries
inflicted by a defamatory publication was provided exclusively by
state courts and legislatures.' The Supreme Court consistently held
that the first amendment did not extend to libelous words. '9
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 the Supreme Court deter-
mined for the first time the extent of the first amendment limitation
on a state's power to award damages in a libel action. The Court
formulated a federal rule prohibiting a public official 2' from recover-
published. See cases collected in note 1 supra, specifically Gariepy v. Pearson, 207
F.2d 15, 16 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953); Kilian v. Stackpole Sons,
Inc., 98 F. Supp: 500, 503 (M.D. Pa. 1951); Weller v. Home News Publishing Co.,
112 N.J. Super. 502, 508, 271 A.2d 738, 741 (Law Div. 1970). Thus, if the plaintiff
established a cause of action, he could recover even if the defendant was not negli-
gent in defaming the plaintiff or did not intend to injure the plaintiff. W. PRossER,
supra note 10, § 113, at 771. But the plaintiff could not recover punitive damages
unless he showed some degree of culpability on the part of the defendant. Gertz, 418
U.S. at 347-48; 3 J. DOOLEY, supra note 10, § 36.05, at 20.
15. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
16. Id. at 347.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 369-70 (White, J., dissenting); Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 350 Mo. 572,
166 S.W.2d 1065 (1943); Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320, 153 A.2d 36
(1959); Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889
(1955).
19. See note 4 supra.
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. See note 9 supra for a definition of public officials. Sullivan was an elected
commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama who alleged that he was defamed by a full
[Vol. XI
1982] REPUTATIONAL INTERESTS
ing damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. 22
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,2 3 the Court extended the New
York Times rule to public figures without defining this class of plain-
tiffs. 2 4 Emphasizing specific facts, 25 the Court concluded that both
plaintiffs, Butts and Walker, commanded substantial independent 2
public interest by virtue of their voluntary acts 27 and had sufficient
access to the means of counterargument to expose the falsity of the
defamatory statements.2 8 The majority concluded that extension of
page advertisement which implied that he took part in the "maltreatment" of black
students. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256-57.
22. See note 10 supra for a definition of actual malice. Integral to the Court's
reasoning were concerns that libel can claim no "talismanic immunity" from consti-
tutional limitations, New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269, and that the first amendment
freedoms could not survive in the "pall of fear and timidity" imposed by a succession
of civil judgments against public critics. Id. at 278.
23. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court considered the companion cases of Butts and
Associated Press v. Walker. Noting that state and federal courts were uncertain as to
the reach of the New York Times rule, the Court addressed the problem of interpret-
ing that rule too narrowly or too broadly. Two considerations which pressed the
Court were that the New York Times rule would give "constitutionally adequate
protection only in a limited field" or that it would go "far to immunize the press from
having to make just reparation for the infliction of needless injury. ... Id. at 135.
Butts, the athletic director at the University of Georgia, claimed he was defamed by
a published statement accusing him of fixing a football game in a conversation with
Coach Bear Bryant of Alabama. Id. at 135-36. Walker, a retired army officer,
claimed he was defamed by false reports of his action during a riot which erupted
when federal marshals attempted to enforce a court decree ordering the University of
Mississippi to admit a black student. Id. at 140-41.
24. Id. at 154-55. The Court referred to the ordinary tort definition of "public
figure." Id. at 154 (citing Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 221
N.E.2d 543, 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (1966) (privacy interests of public figures are
afforded very little protection), remanded on other grounds, 387 U.S. 239 (1967)).
25. Butts was not a public official because he was employed by a private corpora-
tion. He was a well known, highly respected coach and he was negotiating for a
position with a professional team at the time the article appeared. Id. at 135-36.
Walker was a private citizen "acutely interested in the issue of physical federal
intervention" in school segregation matters who had his own following, the "Friends
of Walker." Id. at 140.
26. Id. at 154. The Court distinguished between "the public interest in the circu-
lation of the materials here involved" on the one hand, and the public's interest in the
plaintiff which already existed when these publications appeared. Id.
27. A plaintiff may be a public figure by virtue of his status in the community or
by "purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of
an important public controversy." Id. at 155.
A public figure commands sufficient media access "'to expose through discussion
the falsehoods and fallacies' of the defamatory statements." Id. (citing Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (incorrectly cited in
Butts as a dissenting opinion)).
28. Id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
the New York Times rule to plaintiffs who were not public officials
was justified because distinctions between the public and private
sector, in terms of the functions they perform and the influence they
exert, were blurred.29
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 30 a plurality 3' of the Court
applied the New York Times rule to private individuals involved in
matters of public concern.32 Justice Brennan, announcing the judg-
ment of the Court, noted that the distinctions between public and
private sectors were artificial. 33 He discounted the significance of the
individual's access to the media 34 and the voluntariness of his involve-
ment 35 where the defamatory statement involves a matter of public
concern. The Court decided that the determination of which matters
were of public concern should be made ad hoc. 36
The Court expressly rejected Rosenbloom 37 in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.38 In contrast to Rosenbloom, the Court in Gertz39 noted
that public figures generally have greater access 40 to the media than
private individuals. 41 Emphasizing the voluntariness of the plaintiff's
29. Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Justice Harlan wrote the opinion of the
Court in which seven Justices agreed that both plaintiffs were public figures. Five
Justices agreed that the New York Times rule was applicable to public figures as
Chief Justice Warren stated in his concurring opinion. Four Justices substituted, as
stated in Justice Harlan's opinion, a standard based on "highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
30. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines acquit-
ted of state obscenity charges claimed that he was defamed by broadcasts omitting
the words "allegedly" in descriptions of his arrest. Id. at 36.
31. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court. Justices Burger and
Blackmun concurred in the judgment and joined in the opinion. Justices Black and
White wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at 29.
32. See 3 J. DOOLEY, supra note 10, § 36.06, at 21 n.2 (noting that the term "a
matter of public or general interest" originates in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890)).
33. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 41.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id. at 43.
36. Id. at 44-45.
37. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
38. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court found that the Rosenbloom extension of the
New York Times rule unacceptably abridged the state's legitimate interest in com-
pensating individuals injured by defamatory publications. Id. at 346.
39. Elmer Gertz, an attorney representing the family of a youth killed by a
policeman in a civil action against the policeman, was the subject of a news article
containing serious inaccuracies and labeling him a "Communist-fronter" and a "Len-
inist." Id. at 325-26.
40. Id. at 344.
41. Id. at 345. "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public
figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary
public figures must be exceedingly rare." Id.
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role,42 the Court noted that public figures usually assumed the risk of
being defamed. 43
The Court recognized that the common law of strict liability44
induced self-censorship by the press 45 but acknowledged that the New
York Times rule exacted a high price from the defamed. 46 Neverthe-
less, the Court rejected an ad hoc balancing of the interests. 47 Instead,
the Court established broad rules of general application, 48 cognizant
that these rules might group together factually dissimilar cases. 49
The Court distinguished between all purpose public figures and
limited issue public figures and described the general characteristics of
each group. The all purpose public figure achieves substantial power
and influence, or pervasive fame or notoriety, in the affairs of soci-
ety. 50 The limited issue public figure voluntarily injects himself, or is
42. Id. at 344.
43. Id. at 345.
44. See note 14 supra.
45. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
46. Id.
47. The Court concluded that the ad hoc balancing approach to the determination
of whether the defendant had a privilege to defame "would lead to unpredictable
results and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the
lower courts unmanageable." Id. at 343.
48. Id. at 343-45. The Court focused its inquiry on the individual plaintiff's
participation in "the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation." Id. at
352. This freed the Court from the burden of determining whether a matter was of
public interest and provided a standard which recognized that a plaintiff may be a
public figure with respect to one controversy and a private figure with respect to a
second controversy. The dual standard accounted for the difference in protections
required and deserved by a private individual and a public figure, respectively.
Thus, the private individual could recover on a showing of negligence, whereas a
public figure would have to show actual malice. Id.
49. Id. at 344. The Court implicitly recognized that the general characteristics of
both types of public figures would manifest themselves in diverse factual patterns.
"Such rules necessarily treat alike various cases involving differences as well as
similarities." Id.
50. Id. at 345. See, e.g., Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188
(8th Cir. 1966) (any significant leader who seeks to capitalize on his ability to guide
public policy is a public figure), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967); Rosanova v.
Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (plaintiff who had previously
received extensive publicity concerning alleged underworld contacts and his relation-
ship with a particular union was a public figure), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978);
Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395 (former legislator who was politi-
cally and professionally well known was a public figure), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891
(1977); Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 559-60 (Wyo. 1976)
(plaintiff who was a businessman, an active local politician, a former state insurance
commissioner, and a promoter of a nationally recognized drum and bugle corps, was
a public figure).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
drawn, into a specific controversy. 5' Both engage the public's atten-
tion to influence, or assume special prominence in, the resolution of
public questions.5 2
Classification of a limited issue public figure depends on the "na-
ture and extent" of the individual's participation in the controversy. 53
Significantly, the Court said that the communications industry is
entitled to act on the assumption that public figures assumed the risk
of injury from defamatory publications and is protected in this as-
sumption by the application of the New York Times rule.54
Gertz provided that states were free to set their own standards of
liability for actions brought by private individuals so long as the states
did not impose strict liability. 55 The Court established negligence as a
51. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. See, e.g., Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967,
973 (Okla. 1977) (a candidate for public office assumes special prominence in the
resolution of a public issue by filing a declaration of candidacy); Press, Inc. v.
Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Tenn. 1978) (a junior social worker was a public
figure for the purposes of an article concerning her role in a child abuse case and her
discussions with the child's mother); Exner v. American Medical Ass'n, 12 Wash.
App. 215, 224, 529 P.2d 863, 870 (Ct. App. 1974) (plaintiff became a public figure
by his participation in a controversy concerning the flouridation of public water
supplies); Beatty v. Republican Herald Publishing Co., 291 Minn. 34, 38, 189
N.W.2d 182, 185 (1971) (plaintiff was a public figure on the basis of activities in
opposition to urban renewal). But see Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club,
595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff, drawn into the public eye by a contract
dispute, was a public figure with respect to his playing; therefore, an article discus-
sing a false allegation by a team physician that plaintiff suffered from a terminal
disease was privileged); American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 375 So. 2d 239
(Ala. 1979) (insurance company is a limited issue public figure). See Adams v.
Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 560 n.4 (Wyo. 1976) for an exhaustive
survey of state court application of the public figure criteria.
52. Compare Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th
Cir. 1966) (Nobel Prize winning chemistry professor "obviously deemed himself
influential and . . . was undertaking to provide leadership among many academic
and scientific people and to bring forces from many nations of differing political
ideologies to bear upon the problem" of nuclear testing), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909
(1967) (all purpose public figure) with Exner v. American Medical Ass'n, 12 Wash.
App. 215, 224, 529 P.2d 863, 870 (Ct. App. 1974) (plaintiff became a public figure
by his participation in a local controversy concerning the flouridation of public water
supplies) (limited issue public figure).
53. A plaintiff should be found to be an all purpose public figure only where the
evidence clearly demonstrates general fame and pervasive involvement in public
matters. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Limited issue public figure status is determined by
"looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation." Id.
54. Id. at 345.
55. Id. at 347. See note I supra.
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constitutional minimum. 56 States could not, however, award pre-
sumed damages under any circumstances 57 and could award punitive
damages only on a showing of actual malice.5 8
In his dissent, Justice White concluded that the majority view
federalized major aspects of libel law and declared unconstitutional
the defamation law of most states. 59 Justice White felt such radical
changes in defamation law were neither "required by the first amend-
ment" nor "necessitated by our present circumstances.- 60
Notwithstanding the logic of Justice White's dissent, 6 1 the Court
construed the first amendment to require a constitutional privilege
against liability for defamation of private individuals. The Court
constructed a standard that classified plaintiffs into public men and
private individuals and structured the constitutional privilege along
these lines. 2 Consequently, when considering whether the constitu-
tional privilege attaches, a court's focus should be whether the plain-
tiff was a private individual at the time of the controversy giving rise
to the defamatory publication.6 3
56. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
57. "[A]ll awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the in-
jury .. ." Id. at 350. Although the Court doesn't specifically state that presumed
damages may not be recovered, in view of this language, it would seem likely that
recovery for presumed damages is at least severely restricted. See id.; see also note 1
supra for a discussion of libel and slander per se.
58. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. "The common law of defamation is an oddity
of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without
evidence of actual loss." Id. at 349. "In most jurisdictions, jury discretion over the
amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive." Id. at
350.
59. Id. at 369-70 (White, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 376-77.
61. Justice White felt that there was no substantial threat of self-censorship by the
press, id. at 390, and argued that the press would be adequately protected by the rule
limiting presumed and punitive damages. Id.
62. The use of the term "public men" to refer to both public officials and public
figures originates in Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Curtis, 388 U.S. at
165. This classification includes limited issue public figures. Id. at 164. In Gertz, the
Court established "broad rules of general application" to distinguish public figures
from private individuals. 418 U.S. at 343-45. States determine the standards of
liability in actions brought by private individuals. Id. at 347. This distinction per-
mits, in actions by private individuals, "the states to impose liability on the publisher
or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing than that
required by New York Times." Id. at 348.
63. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. The court should determine in what way the plaintiff
abdicated his status as a private individual and assumed special prominence in the
resolution of public questions. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note
10, at 785.
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In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,6 4 the Court considered what a "public
controversy"6 5 was within the meaning of Gertz. The Court empha-
sized that it was not resurrecting the Rosenbloom"6 approach which
inquired whether the matter was of public concern6 7 and that it
would not, in these cases, look to the subject matter of the controversy
to determine if a privilege existed. Rather, the Court indicated that
the inquiry was whether it was a controversy in fact, and concluded
that a divorce proceeding was not a "public controversy" within the
meaning of Gertz. The Court noted that Mrs. Firestone did not
voluntarily bring attention to herself because judicial dissolution was
the only way to obtain release from the marriage.68 Refining "public
controversies," the Court expressly refused to equate "public contro-
versies" with matters of public interest. 9
64. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). The Time magazine article reported that "[t]he 17-month
intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both
sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair curl.' " Id. at 452. The Court found
that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure. Id. at 453.
65. Id. at 454.
66. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68
(1974). "We repudiated [Rosenbloom] in Gertz, and in Firestone... and we reject it
again today." See generally Comment, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Sowing the Seeds of
Gertz, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 123 (1977), which criticizes the approach which focuses
on whether the plaintiff attempted to influence the resolution of the issues involved in
the controversy. Id. at 134. The author argues that this places "an unduly heavy
burden on the media" because "a publisher must now determine not only whether
someone has voluntarily placed himself in the public eye, but also whether he has
done so for the express purpose of influencing a particular controversy's resolution."
Id. at 134-35. This arguably "obliterate[s] the line between media circumspection
and censorship." Id. at 146.
Wolston laid to rest any doubt about the vitality of Rosenbloom. See Wolston, 443
U.S. at 167-68. In choosing to focus its inquiry on the individual's participation in
"the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation," Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352,
the Court enunciated three specific reasons: first, the Rosenbloom extension of the
New York Times rule unacceptably abridged the state's legitimate interest in com-
pensating individuals injured by defamatory publications, id. at 346; second, it
concluded that this approach "would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain
expectations," id. at 343; and third, the Court concluded that this approach "could
render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable." Id. Consequently, the
Court's continued repudiation of Rosenbloom in favor of an approach which focuses
on the individual's participation in the resolution of the controversy suggests that this
approach affords the appropriate balance of the respective interests. See also Wald-
baum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing the
needs of both the press and the public for clear guidelines), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898
(1980).
67. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43-44.
68. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454. This is so "even though the marital difficulties of
extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading
public." Id.
69. Id. The Court remanded the case to the state court because the state court
failed to specify the basis of liability. Id. at 464; cf. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. The
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III. Subsequent Limitations
Increasingly, an individual's cause of action for defamation has
been restricted by state and federal courts interpreting overbroadly
first amendment limitations. 70 Since the New York Times rule is a rule
of constitutional law, states cannot curtail the privilege against liabil-
ity for defamation concerning a "public plaintiff"; 71 states can, how-
ever, limit a private individual's cause of action.
72
There are basically four ways by which a state limits an individual's
cause of action. Some states broaden the limited issue public figure
category and thereby decrease the class of private plaintiffs. 73 Some
states require the private individual to prove actual malice when the
defamatory sfatement involves a matter of public concern.74 This
Court noted that Mrs. Firestone's press conferences did not convert her into a public
figure because these conferences were not intended to have an effect on the marital
controversy, and she did not use them to thrust herself to the forefront of some
unrelated controversy to influence its resolution. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 n.3.
70. Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle, 3 Kan. App. 2d 146, 152-53, 591 P.2d 635, 641 (Ct.
App.) (plaintiff who made a substantial contribution to a person in charge of a
government agency and then received a contract, without bidding, from that agency
is a public figure for the limited purpose of matters related to the contract), rev'd on
other grounds, 226 Kan. 167, 597 P.2d 611 (1979) (finding a genuine issue of material
fact concerning actual malice). Compare Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634, 637 (10th
Cir.) (plaintiff, a worker on a national political campaign, was not a public figure as
the court focused on plaintiff's status only in the state where the defamation oc-
curred), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 (1981) with Clawson v. Longview Publishing
Co., 91 Wash. 2d 408, 417, 589 P.2d 1223, 1228 (1979) (extent of the public official's
power and the degree of his discretion in performing his official duties determines the
scope of the privilege).
71. Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (court
strictly applied the standards established by the Supreme Court); Reaves v. Foster,
200 So. 2d 453, 458 (Miss. 1967) (noting that the "federal courts have preempted the
field of libel and slander . . ."); Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, Inc., 598
S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that "the states still retain a legitimate
interest in providing a vehicle for the vindication of injury to reputation provided
that they adhere to recognized constitutional standards now prevailing in this area of
the law").
72. Rowe v. Metz, 39 Colo. App. 20, 22, 564 P.2d 425, 427 (Ct. App. 1977)
(noting that Gertz applies equally to suits against non-media), rev'd, 195 Colo. 424-
25, 579 P.2d 83, 84 (1978) (noting that media and non-media defendants may be
treated differently with respect to proof of damages); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise
Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 536, 543 P.2d 1356, 1366 (1975) (court refrains from
changing the negligence standard but reserves the question).
73. Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 469, 446 A.2d
469, 478 (1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1982) (No. 82-130);
Steere v. Cupp, 226 Kan. 566, 573-74, 602 P.2d 1267, 1273-74 (1979) (finding an
attorney who was a well known local figure and who had achieved some influence in
the community was an all purpose public figure but not a limited issue public figure
for the purpose of the defense of a particular defendant in a well-publicized trial); see
note 80 infra.
74. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
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resurrection of Rosenbloom7 5 exceeds the constitutionally required
showing of negligence. 76 Some states increase the plaintiff's procedural
burden 77 by requiring the plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to consti-
tute actual malice in order to avoid summary judgment. 78 Finally,
some states extend the constitutional privilege against liability for
defamation to non-media defendants. 9
A. Gertz Standards Interpreted
When the courts determine that a plaintiff is a public figure by
overgeneralizing the Gertz standards,8 ° the courts consequently give
insufficient consideration and protection to the private individual.
The individual who is found to be a public figure in this way must
now prove actual malice to recover even though the reasons justifying
the creation of the public figure category are absent. 8' Gertz recog-
75. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of Rosenbloom.
76. See note 56 supra.
77. For the purpose of this Note, this requirement of pleading summary judgment
is treated as a procedural burden because it requires the plaintiff to plead in his
complaint facts sufficient to constitute actual malice, quite apart from what he can
prove at trial. This requirement does not add to his substantive burden, as he must
prove actual malice if he is found to be a public figure, but places this burden at an
earlier point in the proceedings. See generally Note, Summary Judgment in Defama-
tion Actions: A Threat to the Substantive Rights of Public Figure Plaintiffs, 3 CAn-
Dozo L. REv. 105, 112-13 (1981) (finding that summary judgment is inappropriate
because the actual malice standard calls into question the defendant's mental state).
78. See note 110 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of summary judg-
ment as a limitation on a private individual's cause of action.
79. See note 121 infra and accompanying text.
80. Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 446 A.2d 469
(1982) (president and secretary-treasurer of a taxpayer association who led a drive for
a referendum election on a municipal appropriation were limited issue public fig-
ures), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1982) (No. 82-130) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (the New Jersey Supreme Court erred in concluding that the court's
conclusion was compelled by the first and fourteenth amendments); Steere v. Cupp,
226 Kan. 566, 573-74, 602 P. 2d 1267, 1273-74 (1979) (an attorney who practiced
law in a community for thirty-two years, served as county attorney for eight years,
participated as a business, social, and professional leader in community affairs, and
served as counsel in a highly publicized murder trial was an all purpose public
figure); American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 375 So. 2d 239, 242 (Ala. 1979)
(a corporation whose dealings are subject to state regulations and which owes its
existence as a corporate entity to the state is a public figure because it invites
attention and comment from the media); NAACP v. Moody, 350 So. 2d 1365 (Miss.
1977) (highway patrol officer was a public figure); Wright v. Haas, 586 P.2d 1093
(Okla. 1978) (member of civic organization who wrote a letter to the editor concern-
ing his organization was a public figure); DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 2 R.I. Adv. Sh. 67,
414 A.2d 806 (1980) (ethnic community leader).
81. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 (1979) (New York Times and its
progeny "rested primarily on the conviction that the common law of libel gave
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nized that a private individual neither abrogates his private status nor
enjoys ready access to self-help in the same way or to the extent that a
public figure does. 82 The distinction between these two categories of
plaintiffs-public figures and private individuals-is essentially one of
degree. 83 This distinction has received inconsistent judicial interpreta-
tion. 84
insufficient protection to the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and
freedom of press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that liability for
damages be conditioned on the specified showing of culpable conduct by those who
publish defamatory falsehood"). The Court in Gertz concluded that the states could
specify the required showing of culpable conduct. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
82. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 ("private individuals are not only more vulnerable
to injury than public officials and public figures: they are also more deserving of
recovery"). But see Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 47 ("[i]f the States fear that private
citizens will not be able to respond adequately ... the solution lies in the direction of
ensuring their ability to respond . . ."); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 681-82, 321 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ct.
App. 1974) (the proper solution for any lack of access on the part of all citizens,
whether 'public' or 'private' is not the expansion of the right to sue for defamation,
but rather the passage of state laws creating a limited right to respond to defamatory
falsehoods"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
83. The distinction among public officials, all purpose public figures and limited
issue public figures is decisive in determining the scope of the privilege accorded the
press. See, e.g., (1) public officials: Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274
(1971) (political candidate's "office" "put[s] before the voters every conceivable
aspect of his public and private life . . ."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77
(1964) ("anything which might touch on [a state judge's] fitness for office" is privi-
leged) (2) all purpose public figures: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d
1238 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff husband and wife who once, as professionals, "sought"
press coverage were public figures for the purpose of an article falsely alleging
marital difficulties), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff children of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, cast into the
limelight by the publicity surrounding their parents' trial over 20 years prior to the
defamation, were public figures for the purpose of the publication of their parents'
private letters), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Fitzgerald v. Minnesota Chiro-
practic Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 269 (Minn. 1980) (plaintiff, an Olympic medalist in
skating was a public figure for the purpose of reports concerning him years after his
skating career ended) (3) limited issue public figures: Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644
F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff, a police informant, was not a public figure for
the limited purpose of articles charging he broke into an attorney's office and stole
documents); Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634 (10th Cir.) (plaintiff who previously
worked in a high level federal government position at the time of the article and was
an aide to Senator Hatch's campaign was not a public figure with respect to a
statement that the plaintiff was a former "bagman" for Spiro Agnew), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1031 (1981); Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle, 3 Kan. App. 2d 146, 591 P.2d 635
(Ct. App.) (plaintiff who made a substantial contribution to the head of a govern-
ment agency and then received a contract, without bidding, from that agency is a
public figure for the limited purpose of matters related to the contract), rev'd on
other grounds, 226 Kan. 167, 597 P.2d 611 (1979) (finding a genuine issue of material
fact concerning actual malice).
84. Two courts ruling on similar facts reached inconsistent conclusions. Thus, in
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975), a
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When a court concludes hastily that a plaintiff assumed special
prominence in the resolution of public questions, the public figure
category becomes unjustifiably broad.8 5 In Lawrence v. Bauer Pub-
li.hing & Printing Ltd.,8" the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
the "obvious purpose" of one plaintiff's regular attendance at council
meetings as president of a taxpayer's association, presentation of the
association position, and initiation of a petition drive for a referendum
vote was the resolution of the controversy.8 7 Apparently the court
equated choosing a side in the dispute with resolving the issue in one's
favor. In so doing, the decision erroneously looks to the plaintiff's
Massachusetts court found that a plaintiff who had participated actively in commu-
nity affairs, belonged to various fraternal organizations, and performed official
duties as a school employee and a member of the redevelopment agency was not a
public figure because he did not engage the public's attention in an attempt to
influence the outcome of public issues. In contrast, a Kansas court in Steere v. Cupp,
226 Kan. 566, 602 P.2d 1267 (1979), found that an attorney who practiced law in a
community for thirty-two years, served as county attorney for eight years, partici-
pated widely in community affairs, and was involved in a highly publicized trial was
an all purpose public figure. Inexplicably, the court then concluded that he was not a
limited issue public figure for the limited purpose of a case in which he represented a
client. Id. at 573-74, 602 P.2d at 1274.
85. The correct approach is illustrated by Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d
777 (1979) where the court concluded that there was evidence that the plaintiff horse
trainer was well known and also that there was evidence of a controversy, but there
was no evidence that the plaintiff had attempted in any way to influence the
controversy or that he had taken any public part in the controversy whatsoever. See
also Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 636, 590 S.W.2d 840, 844
(1979) (a suspended attorney who was required to take a reinstatement examination
was not a public figure because his activities were restricted to complying with a
court mandate), cert. denied sub nom. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 444
U.S. 1076 (1980); Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 282, __, 649 P.2d 462, 467-68
(also reported at 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. 920, 924-25) (1982) (an attorney who is
professionally and politically well known is not a public figure as his influence cannot
be said to be pervasive and he did not inject himself into the controversy). But see
Wright v. Haas, 586 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Okla. 1978) (plaintiff voluntarily injected
himself into the vortex of the public controversy by writing a letter to the editor).
86. 89 N.J. 451, 446 A. 2d 469 (1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S. Nov.
9, 1982) (No. 82-130). In Lawrence, the president and the secretary-treasurer of a
taxpayer association brought a libel suit claiming they were defamed by a newspaper
article which said that forgery charges "may loom" for the men in connection with
their petition drive to seek a referendum vote on the firehouse appropriation. Id. at
456, 446 A.2d at 470. See generally Hirsch, Survey of N.J. Libel Law, 110 N.J.L.J.
421 (Oct. 14, 1982) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court expanded the public
figure definition); Krasner, Balancing Scales of Reputation Versus Press Freedom,
110 N.J.L.J. 421 (Oct. 14, 1982) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court ex-
panded the public figure classification to embrace "persons who might otherwise be
considered private persons").
87. Lawrence, 89 N.J. at 463, 446 A.2d at 475.
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status in the association rather than his role in resolving the contro-
versy.8 8
A court may also overbroaden the public figure category in the way
it defines a private individual and distinguishes public figures.89 In
Lawrence,90 the court found that the co-plaintiff's activities "far ex-
ceeded the role of a private figure." 9' The court, however, never
specified what aspects of his conduct9 2 convinced the court he was a
public figure.9 3 This leaves a private individual considering participa-
tion in public affairs with insufficient guidelines for determining the
effect which these actions will have on his legal remedies for defama-
tion.9 4 He requires more guidance than provided in Gertz-that a
private individual loses his protection when he assumes "special prom-
inence" in the resolution of a public controversy.9 5 Rather, he requires
88. Id. at 465, 446 A.2d at 476. The phrase "special prominence in the resolution
of public questions" is ambiguous. It can refer either (1) to prominence in choosing
the solution to a particular controversy or (2) to prominence in suggesting the method
of arriving at that solution. In the case of Lawrence, this distinction is illustrated by
the issue of whether the community should expend monies to build a firehouse.
Prominence in choosing the solution here means an integral role in deciding whether
or not to spend the money. Prominence in suggesting the method of arriving at the
solution means being a central figure in the decision whether to have the question
decided by the council or by popular vote. The plaintiffs in Lawrence were promi-
nent in seeking popular vote but this type of prominence does not seem to be that
which the Supreme Court considers necessary and sufficient to cost one protection
under defamation law. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 n.3 (construing "resolution" to
mean "solution").
89. Lawrence, 89 N.J. at 465, 446 A.2d at 476. As the Wyoming court noted in
Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976), one justification for
treating a public figure under the New York Times rule is that the courts assume he
has ready media access. The Supreme Court has recognized that a private individual
does not become a public figure merely because he becomes involved in a matter
which attracts public attention. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167
(1979)(person pleading guilty to contempt for failure to appear before a federal
grand jury is not a public figure). Plaintiffs become public figures by virtue of the
public interest in the plaintiff quite'apart from that generated by any controversy.
Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (App. Ct. 1974) (high
school teachers and coaches become public figures because of their positions in the
community).
90. 89 N.J. 451, 446 A.2d 469 (1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov.
9, 1982) (No. 82-130).
91. Id. at 465, 446 A.2d at 476.
92. Id. The court, noting that Lawrence's and Simpson's activities differed only n
degree, focused on Simpson's participation in the petition drive, the fact that his
name appeared on the petition as an association committee member, his door-to-door
collection of at least 250 signatures on the petitions, and the fact that he wrote at
least one letter to the editor on the matter. Id.
93. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 48-54 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the general
guidelines for determining public figure status which Gertz sets forth.
95. See note 54 supra.
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a specific explanation as to what extent he can participate in public
affairs without abrogating his rights; he requires a practical indication
as to what acts cost him his protection under the law of defamation
and transfer his rights to the press in the form of a privilege against
liability for defamation. 6
B. Rosenbloom Resurrected
Since Gertz, a minority of states have required a higher standard of
culpability when an alleged defamation relates to a matter of public
concern.9 7 Illustrative of this approach is Chapadeu v. Utica Observer
96. See Lawrence, 89 N.J. at 476, 446 A.2d at 481-82 (Schreiber, J., dissenting)
(noting that after the article appeared, Simpson stopped attending and speaking at
council meetings and Lawrence had second thoughts about attending the meetings).
Justice Story recognized the potential chilling effect on citizen activity which would
result if the press were not subject to the reasonable limitations of libel law. 2 J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1880, at 610
(4th ed. 1873). He noted that the press "might become the scourge of the republic,
first by denouncing the principles of liberty, and then, by rendering the most virtu-
ous patriot odious through the terrors of the press, introducing despotism in its worst
form." Id.; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 392 (White, J., dissenting)(recognizing that
defamatory statements may frustrate the search for truth and injure individuals);
Steere v. Cupp, 226 Kan. 566, 578, 602 P.2d 1267, 1276 (1979) (Miller, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that broadly enlarging the public figure category deprives individuals
"of the rights and protection which should be their due"); L. ELDEEDGE, THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION 283-85 (1978) (criticizes weighing individual reputational interests
against the value of uninhibited free speech); Note, Gertz v. Robert Welch: Reviving
the Libel Action, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 450, 460 (1975) ("an individual may become
reluctant to participate in the political process or other controversial and visible
avocations, if that participation enables newspapers to spotlight his activities and to
defame him with relative impunity"); see note 131 infra and accompanying text.
97. The following seven states, of the twenty-four states choosing a standard of
liability for actions brought by private individuals, have chosen to resurrect Ro-
senbloom. Colorado: Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d
450 (1975) (article discussing antique store operator's efforts to return stolen goods
was privileged as relating to a matter of public concern); Idaho: Bandelin v. Pietsch,
98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395 (the New York Times privilege applies to reports concern-
ing plaintiff's negligent management of an estate), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977);
Indiana: Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications Inc., 162
Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1974) (reports alleging that the company
which installed a furnace had no permit and that a fatal electrical fire may have been
caused by the furnace were privileged), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Lousiana:
Mashburn v. Collin, 335 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977) (reports criticizing a restaurant which
advertised and sought commercial patrons was privileged); Michigan: Peisner v.
Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (Ct. App. 1978) (report
concerning plaintiff attorney's representation of an indigent defendant privileged by
virtue of the public interest in matters of the administration of justice); New York:
Chapadeu v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975) (arrest of public school teacher for drug offenses was a matter of
public concern); Utah: Seegmiller v. K.S.L., Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981)
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Dispatch, Inc.9 8 In Chapadeu,"9 a public school teacher arrested on
narcotics charges claimed he was defamed by a publication errone-
(reports concerning public health and safety where the question concerns the expend-
iture of public funds or the performance of official duties by government officials are
privileged).
The following seventeen states chose a negligence standard. Arizona: Peagler v.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977) (negligence standard
applicable where newspaper charged that plaintiff had the largest number of better
business bureau complaints lodged against it); Arkansas: Dodrill v. Arkansas Demo-
crat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979)(action by suspended attorney against
newspaper which published report that the attorney failed an examination for rein-
statement), cert. denied sub. nom. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 444 U.S.
1076 (1980); California: Vegod v. American Broadcasting Co., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 160
Cal. Rptr. 97, 603 P.2d'14 (1979) (merely doing business with parties to a public
controversy does not elevate one to public figure status), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886
(1980); Connecticut: Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d
472 (Super. Ct. 1975) (report falsely stating that the plaintiff police officer's son had
been arrested); Florida: From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court noted that some cases in dicta adopted negligence
standard, but refrained from adopting any standard); Hawaii: Cahill v. Hawaiian
Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975) (statement that plaintiff is
a communist); Illinois: Troman v. Wood, 62 Iii. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975)
(article suggesting that plaintiff's home served as headquarters for a youth gang);
Kentucky: McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky.
1981) (article repeating allegations that attorney would fix a criminal trial by bribing
a judge), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3916 (U.S. May 18, 1982) (No. 81-1741);
Maryland: Emprey v. Holly, 48 Md. App. 571, 429 A.2d 251 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981)
(statement that television personality hurt his knee while looting a store), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982)(only issue on appeal was
punitive damages); New Hampshire: McCusker v. Valley News, 121 N.H. 258, 428
A.2d 493 (1981) (government employees who are not public officials need only prove
negligence) (dictum), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017 (1982); New Mexico: Marchiondo
v. Brown, 98 N.M. 282, 649 P.2d 462 (1982) (also reported in 21 N.M. St.
B.Bull.920) (report concerning plaintiff attorney's alleged ties with organized crime);
Tennessee: Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978) (impli-
cation that plaintiff wife was engaged in an extramarital affair); Texas: Poe v. San
Antonio Express News Corp., 590 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1979) (article
falsely accusing school teacher of fondling students); Utah: Seegmiller v. K.S.L.,
Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981) (negligence standard applied where article concerned
mistreatment of horses but did not allege any official involvement or widespread
occurrence); Washington: Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546
P.2d 81 (1976) (article implying that plaintiff in financial difficulties left town with
money belonging to others); Wisconsin: Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318
N.W.2d 141 (1982) (statement that employee-stockholder was fired by his employer),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1982) (No. 81-2376) (judgment below
not final judgment); Washington, D.C.: Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,
424 A.2d 78 (D.C. 1980) (newspaper article stated that plaintiff had killed his wife
during a quarrel when the shooting was accidental), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989
(1981); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 377 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that in the three
years between Rosenbloom and Gertz, seventeen states had adopted the Rosenbloom
rationale).
98. 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
99. Id. at 197, 341 N.E.2d at 570, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
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ously linking his arrest with the arrest of two other men on misde-
meanor drug charges. Relying on Rosenbloom, 00 the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court granted summary judgment,
concluding that the statement was privileged absent a showing of
actual malice. 101 Subsequently, Gertz was decided.10 2 Affirming the
decision below, the circuit courts recognized that Gertz permitted the
states substantial latitude in setting standards for private actions.
Within this latitude, the court, declining to follow Gertz's rejection of
Rosenbloom, held that a plaintiff allegedly defamed by a publication
discussing a matter "arguably" of legitimate public concern must
show that the defendant acted in a grossly irresponsible manner. 10 3
Matters of public concern are determined on an ad hoc basis. 10 4
This approach, some argue, is necessary to counter the "chilling ef-
fect" which a lesser standard of liability would have on the press.105
Escalating the threshold standard of liability which a private plaintiff
must satisfy ad hoc fails to accommodate the private individual's
reputational interests.10 6 Moreover, there seems to be no factual sup-
100. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
101. 45 A.D.2d 913, 914, 357 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (4th Dep't 1974).
102. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
103. 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64. The plaintiff "must
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly
irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information
gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties." Id. at 199,
341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
104. See note 36 supra; Cottom v. Meredith Corp., 65 A.D.2d 165, 170, 411
N.Y.S.2d 53, 56 (4th Dep't 1978).
105. See note 97 supra and accompanying text. Cases taking this position construe
the New York Times rule not as an accommodation of two competing interests, but
only as a validation of the press privilege against liability for defamation. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975); Bandelin
v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977); Aafco
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671,
321 N.E.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); see also Phillips
v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78, 93 (D.C. 1980) (Ferren, J., dissenting)
("[O]ur adoption of the negligence standard . . . will force the media toward a
degree of self-censorship that our society can ill afford"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989
(1981).
106. Although Rosenbloom emphasized the potential chilling effect of defamation
actions on the press and subordinated the individual's interest in compensation for
injuries inflicted by a libelous press in order to avoid the potential chilling effect,
Gertz and Firestone clearly recognize that one goal of the New York Times rule is to
find the most appropriate accommodation of both competing interests. See, e.g.,
McCusker v. Valley News, 121 N.H. 258, 428 A.2d 493, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017
(1981); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359
(1977); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); see also
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 390 (White, J., dissenting) ("The press today is vigorous and
robust. To me, it is quite incredible to suggest that threats of libel suits from private
citizens are causing the press to refrain from publishing the truth. I know of no hard
facts to support that proposition and the Court furnishes none.").
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port for the "chilling effect."'' 7 Nevertheless, some courts require
private individuals to comply with Rosenbloom. This approach'0 8
extends the privilege beyond the constitutionally required mini-
mum. 1 As a practical matter, it affords the press a privilege to
defame a private individual regardless of whether he voluntarily as-
sumed the risk that he would incur such injury or whether he can
rebut the falsehood by means of counterargument.
C. Summary Judgment Favored
Some courts favor the use of summary judgment in these first
amendment defamation cases. 0 Granting summary judgment where
the constitutional privilege is asserted sharply limits the individual's
judicial remedy."' In Mashburn v. Collin,112 the Supreme Court of
107. "We have not been referred to any instance in which a matter of general or
public interest has not been adequately reported because of self-censorship on the
part of the news media." Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522,
536, 543 P.2d 1356, 1366 (1975). The Court formulated the accommodation for the
press because it accepted the general principles supporting free press. See New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 278.
108. See notes 48-54 supra and accompanying text. Essentially, this approach
takes the position that "[i]f a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or
because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become in-
volved." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43. But see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 ("The 'public or
general interest' test for determining the applicability of the New York Times stand-
ard to private actions inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake.").
109. See notes 55-58 supra. The Court in Gertz rejected the Rosenbloom approach
because it "would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it
could render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable." Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 343. Further, the Court noted that "[t]he 'public or general interest' test for
determining the applicability of the New York Times standard to private defamation
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake." Id. at 346.
110. See, e.g., Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78, 81 n.1 (D.C.
1980) (motion for summary judgment, "early in the case is particularly appropriate
...where 'chilling' of the freedom of the press and speech is threatened"), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981); Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 342, 563 P.2d 395,
399 (to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff must show facts sufficient to constitute
actual malice), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning,
Inc. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 688, 321 N.E.2d 580, 591
(Ct. App. 1974) (mere showing that a statement is factually incorrect does not create
a genuine issue of fact concerning reckless disregard for the truth), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 913 (1976); Mashburn v. Collins, 355 So. 2d 879, 890 (La. 1977) (in cases
affecting the exercise of first amendment liberties, proper summary judgment prac-
tice is essential).
111. See, e.g., Browning v. Birmingham News, 348 So. 2d 455, 460 (Ala. 1977)
(trial court should have presumed, for the purposes of the summary judgment mo-
tion, that because the complaint did not allege actual malice that plaintiff was a
private individual not required to show actual malice); Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle, 3
Kan. App. 2d 146, 154, 591 P.2d 635, 642 (Ct. App.) (summary judgment should be
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Louisiana considered an appeal from a grant of summary judgment
for the defendant, a food critic who critiqued the plaintiff's restau-
rant. " 3 The court concluded that where the defendant asserts a consti-
tutional privilege, the court must determine whether the plaintiff's
pleadings present a genuine issue of fact sufficient to support a finding
of actual malice."14 The court noted that summary judgment is "an
effective screening device for avoiding the unnecessary harassment of
defendants by unmeritorious actions" and is essential to the constitu-
tional privilege.1 5 Gertz"l6 squarely supports the position which rec-
ognizes that a public plaintiff must prove, but need not plead, actual
malice. " 7 In Gallagher v. Johnson,l i1 the Supreme Court of Montana
considered the appeal of the director of an urban development agency
where the trial court dismissed his action against an agency critic.
Reversing and remanding, the court held that actual malice need not
be specifically pleaded to preserve the first amendment protections."l
Other decisions support this conclusion.12 0
D. The Constitutional Privilege Extended to Non-Media Defendants
Some courts extend the constitutional privilege against liability for
defamation to non-media defendants.' 2 1 Various arguments are ad-
employed with caution in defamation cases), rev'd on other grounds, 226 Kan. 167,
597 P.2d 611 (1979); Gallagher v. Johnson, 37 Mont. 940, 611 P.2d 613 (1980)
(public official not required to plead sufficient facts to show actual malice); Mc-
Cusker v. Valley News, 121 N.H. 258, 428 A.2d 493 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1017 (1981). The defendant's summary judgment burden, according to one court, is
to establish (1) that plaintiff was a public official, (2) the truth of the statements
contained in the publication, (3) the absence of malice, (4) that the publication was
privileged, (5) the absence of any negligence, and (6) the absence of damages. Poe v.
San Antonio Express News Corp., 590 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1979).
112. 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977).
113. The court concluded that, since the restaurant was a matter of public con-
cern, the statements were privileged absent a showing of actual malice. Id. at 889-90.
The critique read "T'aint Creole, t'aint Cajun, t'aint French, t'aint Country Ameri-
can, t'aint good." Id. at 887.
114. id. at 890.
115. Id. at 891. The court reinstated the trial court's decision which had granted
summary judgment for the defendant. Id.
116. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
117. See note 24 supra and accompanying text; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
118. 37 Mont. 940, 611 P.2d 613 (1980).
119. Id. at 946-47, 611 P.2d at 618. Recently, the Supreme Court in Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (dictum), advised against the use of
summary judgment in defamation actions. The Court noted that since the proof of
actual malice concerns the defendant's state of mind, it does not readily lend itself to
summary disposition. Id. In Hutchinson, the Supreme Court held that concern about
public expenditures is insufficient to make plaintiff a public figure. Id. at 135.
120. See note 111 supra.
121. See, e.g., Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d 239, 247
(Iowa 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981) (No. 81-714);
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vanced. 22 Nevertheless, the emphasis in Gertz on limiting its holding
to the media is clear. 2 3 Moreover, the considerations supporting the
New York Times rule do not support extension of this rule to non-
media defendants. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
defamation is a class of speech unprotected by the first amendment.1
2 4
Extending the New York Times privilege to non-media defendants
would do indirectly what the Supreme Court has refused to do di-
rectly-extend absolute first amendment protection to libelous publi-
cations.
IV. A Suggested Approach
The New York Times rule is a Supreme Court mandate that the
states modify their defamation law to accommodate the competing
interests of preserving individual reputation and fostering free expres-
sion.' 25 When the states extend12 6 the New York Times rule beyond
that expressly required by the Court, they should specify what consti-
tutional considerations justify this extension.
Certainly the state's interest 127 in compensating private individuals
justifies the substantial latitude which the states retain in establishing
Michaud v. Inhabitants of Town of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Me.
1978); Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 94, 341 A.2d 856, 881 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1975).
122. Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 94, 341 A.2d 856, 881 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1975) (limiting the privilege to media defendants would defeat the
underlying rationale for the privilege; it would also present problems of defining the
media); Michaud v. Inhabitants of Town of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113
(Me. 1978) (private letter entitled to the same constitutional protections as a newspa-
per article).
123. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Minn. 1980) (New
York Times rule was "fashioned as an exception to the common law rule to permit the
printed and electronic media to perform their function of informing the public about
newsworthy people and events without undue fear of defamation liability. Thus, its
focus on the defendant's attitude toward the truth of what he said rather than on his
attitude toward the plaintiff is proper only when a media defendant is involved.").
124. See note 4 supra. But see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 (1979)
(primary purpose of the New York Times rule was to afford adequate protection for
the press and avoid self-censorship by the press).
125. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text. The states can establish their
own standards of liability in actions brought by private individuals against media
defendants so long as the court finds some degree of culpability. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
347; see Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markay, 279 Or. 361, 366, 568 P.2d
1359, 1363 (1977) (noting that some states responded to the New York Times line of
cases as an excuse to overhaul their laws of defamation).
127. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text; see also Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) ("[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing
and redressing attacks upon reputation"). A private individual seldom has any alter-
native to legal action for redressing grievances. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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standards for actions brought by private individuals. States should
scrupulously protect this interest. They can do this by preserving a
class of private individual plaintiffs in defamation law. 128 States can
protect this interest also by refusing to resurrect Rosenbloom,129 and
by strictly interpreting Gertz. Undue limitation 130 of the plaintiff's
cause of action may dampen the willingness of capable citizens to take
part in public affairs.13'
The following approach would adequately protect the interests
involved where a media defendant claims that the plaintiff is a limited
issue public figure. The court should first isolate the controversy
which is the subject matter of the publication and ensure that it is a
dispute in fact. 32 Second, the court should measure the plaintiff's role
128. Consider the criticism of the Texas court in Roegelein Provision Co. v.
Mayen, 566 S.W.2d 1 (1978), which noted "[u]nfortunately, the terms private person
or private plaintiff can be defined only negatively and, probably tautologically, in
terms of a person who is neither a public official or a public figure." Id. at 10. The
court must determine whether the plaintiff was a public figure prior to the defama-
tion. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir.)
(holding that plaintiff who was president of the second largest cooperative in the
nation and was a leading advocate of certain cooperative practices was a public
figure for the purpose of an article concerning those practices), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
898 (1980); Arber v. Stahlin, 382 Mich. 300, 305 n.4, 170 N.W.2d 45, 47 n.4 (1969)
(holding that political party workers were not public figures), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
924 (1970).
129. The Rosenbloom approach "would occasion the additional difficulty of forc-
ing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address
issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not. . . . We doubt the wisdom of
committing this task to the conscience of judges." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
130. This results when a court concludes, by overgeneralizing Gertz, or drawing
an improper perspective on the facts, with insufficient regard for the effect of its
decision on the plaintiff, that the plaintiff is a public figure. See notes 80-96 supra
and accompanying text.
131. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir.)
(noting that the individual may choose not to participate in public affairs when that
activity may deprive him of his remedy for injury inflicted by defamatory state-
ments), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). See generally Note, An Analysis of the
Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defamation Plaintiffs Applied to
Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131, 1199-1200 (1976) ("[r]ecogni-
tion by the Court of the danger of inhibiting citizen participation in public affairs,
which is inherent in leaving participants without remedies for defamation, is long
overdue"). But see note 105 supra for cases which emphasize the chilling effect of
libel judgments on the press.
132. In this context, a controversy is not simply a matter which attracts attention
or engages the public's interest. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976).
"[A] public controversy is a dispute that in fact has public attention because its
ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct participants." Waldbaum,
627 F.2d at 1296. See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 167-
68 (1979) ("[a] libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to justify
application of the demanding burden of New York Times"); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
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in the dispute to determine whether the plaintiff in fact enjoyed media
access sufficient to rebut the falsehood and greater than that enjoyed
by a private individual. 133 The court should also specifically determine
the particular facts by which it finds that the plaintiff assumed the
risk he might be defamed or by which it concludes that he engaged the
public's attention to influence, or assumed special prominence, in the
resolution of public questions. Finally, the court should state the facts
which transferred plaintiff's right to recover for his injury to the
defendant in the form of a privilege against liability for defamation.
This emphasis on and articulation of the facts would both ensure
careful consideration of the plaintiff's interests and facilitate appellate
review.
V. Conclusion
The value of an individual's reputation has long been recognized.
The New York Times rule, a comparatively recent development, seeks
to accommodate the competing interests of preserving reputation and
fostering free expression. Applying this rule, which is structured along
a judicial classification of defamation plaintiffs, some courts have
accorded excessive deference to the press by broadening the public
figure category, requiring a private individual involved in matters of
public concern to prove actual malice, favoring the use of summary
judgment, and extending the conditional privilege to non-media de-
fendants. These decisions ascribe insufficient significance to the value
of an individual's reputation and may dampen the willingness of
private citizens to participate in public affairs. To avoid these conse-
quences, an approach which emphasizes the translative fact in the
individual's metamorphosis from private citizen to public figure is
necessary.
Tom Wall
443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) ("[c]learly, those charged with defamation cannot, by their
own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure").
133. "As a general rule, a person who meets this test has access to the media if
defamed." Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294. See Note, supra note 131, at 1210.
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